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Caihua Zhou., Hualin Xie., Xinmin Zhang. Does Fiscal Policy Promote Third-Party Environmental Pollution Control in China? An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach
 
[Release Time:2019-08-17 12:45:35] [Page Views:]


SSCI,《sustainability(IF=2.592).  2019, 11(16), 4434

Does  Fiscal Policy Promote Third-Party Environmental Pollution Control in China? An  Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

Caihua  Zhou 1,2,*, Hualin Xie 1 , Xinmin  Zhang 1

 

  1. Institute of  Ecological Civilization, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang  330013, China

  2. School of  Public Finance and Public Administration, Jiangxi University of Finance and  Economics, Nanchang 330013, China

 

Abstract:To  promote third-party environmental pollution control in China, it is necessary to  dissect the mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution  control. This study first discusses the acting paths of fiscal policies on  third-party environmental pollution control in theory. A tripartite evolutionary  game model involving the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the  third-party enterprise is established. The replicator dynamics, evolutionary  stability strategies, and numerical simulation of the behavior of the three  participants are analyzed to further study the acting mechanism of fiscal policy  in third-party environmental pollution control. In addition, the influences of  other parameters on the implementation of third-party environmental pollution  control are evaluated. The results show that the behaviors of the local  government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise influence  each other. Furthermore, strengthening the relevant fiscal policy, reducing the  risks of the polluting enterprise and third-party enterprise, and improving the  benefit to the local government are conducive to promoting third-party  environmental pollution control in China. Based on these results, this study  proposes the following policy implications: formulating fiscal policies for  third-party environmental pollution control, implementing fiscal policies in a  dynamic and progressive manner, improving the market mechanism of third-party  environmental pollution control, and strengthening the environmental performance  assessment of the local government.

Keywords:environmental  pollution; third-party control; fiscal policy; evolutionary game



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